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I. INTRODUCTION
Because coal miners are exposed to coal dust over long periods of
time,' hundreds of thousands of miners have contracted pneumoconio-
sis (hereinafter black lung), a serious, progressive and crippling ill-
ness.' In response to the horrible effects of black lung disease, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Black Lung Program through several statuto-
ry enactments,3 which are commonly referred to as the Black Lung
1. See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
United States Department of Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 138 (1987).
2. let (referring to pneumoconiosis as "black lung" disease). Black lung is a "a
chronic dust disease of the lung .... including respiratory and pulmonary impairments,
arising out of coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (1994). "This definition in-
cludes, but is not limited to, coal workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis,
anthrasilicosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, progressive massive fibrosis, silicosis or silicotu-
berculosis, arising out of coal mine employment" Id.
3. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat 792,
30 U.S.C. § 801-78, amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat 150, 30
U.S.C. § 901-62, the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, 92 Stat 11, the Black
Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, 92 Stat 95, the Black Lung Benefit Amendments of
1053
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Benefits Act (hereinafter BLBA). 4 The purpose of the BLBA is to
compensate coal miners who have contracted black lung disease. 5 It is
a humanitarian, remedial statute.6
Although the BLBA scheme seems quite complicated,' a benefits
claimant need only prove that: "(a) he or she is totally disabled, (b)
the disability was caused, at least in part, by pneumoconiosis, and (c)
the disability arose out of coal mine employment."8 Also, several stat-
utory presumptions aid the BLBA claimant in establishing his or her
entitlement to BLBA benefits.9
In anticipation of claims for BLBA benefits, Congress empowered
the Department of Labor to administer the benefits available under the
BLBA. ° In adjudicating BLBA claims, the Department of Labor ap-
plies the true doubt rule, which shifts the ultimate burden of persuasion
1981, 95 Stat. 1643, the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, 95 Stat. 1635, 26
U.S.C. § 1 note, and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-272, § 13203(a), (d), 100 Stat. 312, 313, 26 U.S.C. § 9501 note, (1988).
4. 30 U.S.C. § 901-62 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See 30 U.S.C. § 901(b) (1988 and
Supp. V 1993) ("[t]his title may be cited as the 'Black Lung Benefits Act'). See generally
William S. Mattingly, Federal Black Lung Update, 96 W.VA. L. REV. 819 (1994)[hereinafter
Mattingly].
5. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. Skukan v. Consolidated Coal Co., 993 F.2d 1228, 1236 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing
S.Rep. No. 743, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2315,
which states that the BLBA "is intended to be a remedial law"); Freeman United Coal Min-
ing Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Program, 988 F.2d 706, 709-10 (7th Cir.
1993), vacated, 114 S.Ct. 2732 (1994).
7. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 138.
8. Id. at 141. The Court has recognized that it is difficult for BLBA claimants to
prove the elements necessary to establish entitlement. Id. at 158.
9. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1988); 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b) (1994)(if a claimant
was employed as a coal miner for 10 years and is suffering from black lung, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the disease was caused by the coal mining employment); 20
C.F.R. §§ 718.301 to - .306 (1994); 20 C.F.R. §727.203(a) (1994).
10. 30 U.S.C. § 921(a) (1988).
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to the party opposing a benefits claim." Under the true doubt rule,
where the evidence is evenly balanced, the benefits claimant wins.
12
However, the true doubt rule has not gone unchallenged, and it
has been argued that the rule conflicts with Section 7(c) of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (hereinafter the APA). 13 In Director, OWCP v.
Greenwich Collieries,4 the Supreme Court recently heard an appeal
from the Third Circuit concerning this issue and held that the true
doubt rule violates Section 7(c). 5 In so holding, the Court invalidated
the use of the true doubt rule which, in effect, now prohibits an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge [hereinafter AL] from applying it in a BLBA
hearing.16
Before exploring the main issues, this Comment will discuss the
applicable background of the law, the facts of Greenwich, the majority
opinion and the dissenting opinion. Then, this Comment will analyze
whether Greenwich's holding was correct. It will then discuss the im-
pact of the case. Finally, it will discuss whether Congress should enact
legislation that revives the true doubt rule. Ultimately, this Comment
11. Mattingly, supra note 4, at 820 (citing Lessar v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp., 3 Black
Lung Rep. 1-63 (1981); Conley v. Roberts and Schaefer Co., 7 Black Lung Rep. 1-309, 1-
312 n.4 (1984); Provance v. United States Steel Corp., I Black Lung Rep. 1-483 (1978)).
See also Freeman, 988 F.2d at 709 (reviewing the decision of an administrative law judge
who applied the true doubt rule); Skukan, 993 F.2d at 1234 (same).
12. Grizzle v. Pickands Mather and Co., 994 F.2d 1093, 1096 (4th Cir. 1993).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994). See, e.g., Freeman, 988 F.2d at 710-11 (employer ar-
gued that the true doubt rule conflicted with Section 7(c) of the APA).
14. 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994).
15. Id. at 2259. Two other issues were also before the Court. Id. The first issue was
whether the true doubt rule conflicted with the Court's holding in Mullins Coal Co. v. Di-
rector, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, 484
U.S. 135 (1987). Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254. The second issue was whether the true
doubt rule conflicted with 20 C.F.R. Section 718.403 (1994) (burden of proof regulation).
Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254. However, the Court decided the case on the Section 7(c)
issue and avoided passing on whether the true doubt rule violated the Mullins holding or
Section 718.403. Id. at 2259.
16. 114 S. Ct. at 2259. The Court's holding had implications that went beyond the
BLBA. See id. However, this Comment is limited to analyzing the Greenwich decision as it
relates to the BLBA and will avoid analyzing the effects on other workers' compensation
programs, unless such analysis will shed light on the BLBA.
10551995]
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concludes that the Court was correct in invalidating the true doubt rule.
However, the Comment concludes that Congress should revive the rule.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
Greenwich answers the question of whether the true doubt rule
conflicts with Section 7(c) of the APA."7 Accordingly, it is essential
to explore the background of the true doubt rule as well as the back-
ground of Section 7(c).
4. The True Doubt Rule
The true doubt rule is a judicial construct that originated over fifty
years ago in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Burris,8 a case arising under
the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act [hereinaf-
ter the LHWCA]. 9 In Burris, a laborer collapsed and died while at
work.2" His widow filed for benefits, but her application was de-
nied.2" The Burris court overturned the lower court decision and stat-
ed that "where there is doubt, it should be resolved in favor of the in-
jured employee or his dependent family."22 The Burris rule eventually
developed into the true doubt rule,23 and the Department of Labor
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
18. 59 F.2d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1932). See Stephen Yula, Recent Decision, Workers'
Compensation-Black Lung Benefits Act-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit Held that the "True Doubt Rule" Was Invalid Because It Allowed Claimants to
Prevail without Meeting the Required Burden of Persuasion, Greenwich Collieries v. Direc-
tor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 990 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1993), 32 DUQ. L.
REv. 361, 366 (1994)[hereinafter "Yula"] (discussing the evolution of the true doubt rule
and noting that the true doubt rule originated in Burris).
19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988).
20. 59 F.2d at 1043.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1044. The opinion captured the flavor of Mr. Burris's plight, "[t]he day was
very hot; [t]he temperature at 8 o' clock ...was 79 degrees ... and at 11 o'clock 92
degrees in the shade." Id. (emphasis added). "About 11 o'clock ...[Burris] started toward
a water barrel and on his way collapsed." Id. "He ...died that evening from heat prostra-
tion and sunstroke." Id.
23. See Yula, supra note 18, at 366 (claiming that the true doubt rule "has evolved as
a convenient method by some courts and agencies to allocate the burden of persuasion to
the employer").
1056
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adopted the true doubt rule for use in benefits hearings held under the
BLBA.24
Functionally, the true doubt rule is simple: where the evidence is
evenly balanced on both sides, the BLBA claimant is given the benefit
of the doubt and is awarded benefits.25 Because the true doubt rule
allows a BLBA claimant to win where the evidence is equally proba-
tive on both sides, BLBA claimants need only prove that they are as
likely as not to be entitled to benefits. Therefore, under the true
doubt rule, a BLBA benefits claimant does not have to prove his claim
by a preponderance of the evidence, which would require the BLBA
claimant to establish that he is more likely than not to be entitled to
benefits." Thus, the true doubt rule, in effect, shifts the burden of
persuasion to the party opposing the BLBA benefits claim.28
B. Section 7(c) of the APA
In contrast to the true doubt rule, Section 7(c) of the APA29
states, "except as otherwise provided, ...the proponent of a rule or
order has the burden of proof."30 One interpretation of Section 7(c) is
24. See supra note 11 (authority cited therein supports the proposition that the Depart-
ment of Labor utilized the true doubt rule in adjudicating BLBA benefits claims).
25. Freeman, 988 F.2d at 710; Adkins v. Director, OWCP, 958 F.2d 49, 52 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1992).
26. See Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1096 (teaching that under the true doubt rule, the BLBA
claimant wins where the evidence is "equally probative").
27. GEORGE E. Dix ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (JOHN WILLIAM
STRONG ed., 4th ed. 1992). See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12
(1988)(discussing the preponderance of the evidence standard).
28. The reason the true doubt rule has the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion
is that the preponderance of the evidence standard is recognized as the "rock bottom" of
standards of proof. Charleton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
29. The APA applies to BLBA hearings because it adopts the part of the LHWCA
which incorporates the APA. See 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (1988) ("any hearing held under this
chapter shall be conducted in accordance with [the APA]"); 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1988) (in-
corporating Section 919(d)). See also Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185,
(1956) (the Court does not lightly presume exemptions to the APA); Freeman, 988 F.2d at
710 n.6 ("[u]nquestionably, the APA applies to black lung adjudications").
30. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994). The full text reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the
burden of proof. Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agen-
1995] 1057
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that it places the burden of persuasion on the BLBA claimant because
it places the burden of proof on the proponent of an order awarding
benefits: a BLBA claimant.3' However, this argument hinges on the
meaning of the term burden of proof, which has two distinct mean-
ings.32
First, "burden of proof' can be interpreted as meaning the burden
of persuasion.3 When a party bears the burden of persuasion, he
bears the risk of non-persuasion, and loses when the evidence is evenly
balanced. 34 Thus, if the term burden of proof in Section 7(c) places
the burden of persuasion on the proponent of a rule or order, the true
doubt rule is invalid because it relieves the BLBA claimant, the propo-
nent of an order awarding benefits, of the burden of persuasion.35
Second, "burden of proof' can be interpreted as meaning the bur-
den of production.36 When a party bears the burden of production, he
merely bears the burden of coming forward with evidence that, if un-
contradicted, will suffice to establish his claim.37 Furthermore, and
perhaps most importantly, a burden of production does not impose a
burden of persuasion.38 As such, if Section 7(c)'s burden of proof
phrase merely imposes a burden of production, then it does not impose
a burden of persuasion on a BLBA claimant and, therefore, does not
conflict with the true doubt rule.
cy as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial,
or unduly repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order is-
sued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a
party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substan-
tive evidence.
Id
31. See, e.g., Freeman, 988 F.2d at 711 (employer argued, unsuccessfully, that the true
doubt rule conflicted with Section 7(c)).
32. DIX Er AL., supra note 27, at § 336.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. See also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (the true doubt rule
merely requires evenly balanced evidence, whereas the lowest burden of persuasion, the
preponderance standard, requires the evidence to weigh, even if only slightly, in the favor of
the party who bears the burden of persuasion).
36. Dix ET AL., supra note 27, at § 336.
37. Id.
38. Id. at §338.
1058 [Vol. 97:1053
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Notably, the Supreme Court has twice analyzed the meaning of
Section 7(c). Steadman v. SEC9 was the first Supreme Court case
that analyzed the meaning of Section 7(c). In Steadman, the Supreme
Court decided whether Section 7(c) requires the SEC to prove a claim
by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evi-
dence.4" Steadman noted that Section 7(c) requires agency decisions to
be made "in accordance with ... substantial evidence."4  According
to Steadman, "substantial" implies a certain weight of evidence,42 and
"in accordance with" implies that the agency must weigh the evidence
and make its decision according to the weight of the evidence.43
Therefore, the Steadman court concluded that "agency decision[s] must
be made 'in accordance with' the weight of the evidence.""
Although Steadman found that Section 7(c) requires agency deci-
sions to be made in accordance with the weight of the evidence, the
language of Section 7(c) did not reveal exactly what the required
weight of the evidence was in making agency decisions.45 However,
the legislative history of the APA clearly indicated that Congress ex-
pressly adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard in enacting
Section 7(c).46 Further, the preponderance of the evidence standard is
the usual standard in administrative proceedings.47  Consequently,
Steadman held that Section 7(c) requires that administrative agencies
make their decisions in accordance with the preponderance of the evi-
39. 450 U.S. 91 (1981)
40. Id. at 95.
41. Id at 98 (quoting from Section 7(c)) (emphasis omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 450 U.S. at 98-99.
45. Id at 100.
46. Id. at 101. The Court stated, "[a]ny doubt as to the intent of Congress is removed
by the House Report, which expressly adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard:
Where a party having the burden of proceeding has come forward with a prima
facie and substantial case, he will prevail unless his evidence is discredited or
rebutted. In any case, the agency ...must weigh ... [the evidence] and decide
in accordance with the preponderance. In short, these provisions require a conscien-
tious and rational judgment on the whole record in accordance with the proofs
adduced.
Id., citing H.R.Rep.No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 37 (1946).
47. See 450 U.S. at 101-02 n.21.
1995] 1059
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dence.48 In other words, Steadman interpreted Section 7(c) as requir-
ing the SEC to bear a burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the
evidence.49
Two years after Steadman, in NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp.,5" the Supreme Court summarily stated in a footnote that Sec-
tion 7(c) merely imposes a burden of production." The Court made
no mention of Section 7(c) having anything to do with a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard or a burden of persuasion." Notably,
no mention was made of Steadman either. 3 In fact, the footnote in
Transportation Management created a possible point of conflict because
it interpreted Section 7(c) as imposing a mere burden of production,54
whereas Steadman interpreted Section 7(c) as requiring decisions to be
made in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence, which is a
burden of persuasion.5
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Greenwich, the Supreme Court reviewed two decisions of the
Third Circuit. 6 The first decision involved Andrew Ondecko who had
applied for BLBA benefits after working as a coal miner for about
thirty-one years. 7 When Ondecko's case was first litigated, an ALJ
reached the following conclusions: (1) that Ondecko had black lung
disease, (2) that the disease totally disabled him, and (3) that the dis-
ease resulted from his having worked as a coal miner. 8
48. Id. at 102.
49. See Dix Er AL., supra note 27, at §339 (explaining that the preponderance of the
evidence is a standard of proof: a burden of persuasion).
50. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
51. Id. at 403-04 n.7.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 103. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742, 2749 (1993) (referring to the preponderance of the evidence standard as a burden of
persuasion).
56. 114 S. Ct at 2253.
57. Id.
58. Id. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text (outlining the three elements
1060 [Vol. 97:1053
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In reaching the first two conclusions, the ALJ applied the true
doubt rule because the evidence was evenly balanced on both sides
concerning such issues.59 In reaching the third conclusion, the ALJ
applied a rebuttable presumption that Ondecko's black lung disease had
resulted from coal mining work because he had worked as a coal min-
er for over ten years." Because the three elements necessary to estab-
lish entitlement for BLBA benefits had been satisfied, the ALJ awarded
Ondecko benefits.6
Greenwich Collieries was Ondecko's final employer62 and, as
such, was liable for the payment of Ondecko's benefits.63 Consequent-
ly, Greenwich Collieries challenged the AL' s decision to award
Ondecko benefits. 4 The Benefits Review Board concluded that the
ALJ was correct in finding each side's evidence equally probative con-
cerning the first two elements necessary to establish entitlement to
BLBA benefits. 5 Further, the Board held that it was proper for the
ALJ to invoke the true doubt rule and resolve those issues in
Ondecko's favor.6 However, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit vacated this decision and held that the true doubt rule
conflicts with the Department of Labor's regulations and with Supreme
Court precedent. 7
The second case reviewed by the Supreme Court involved Michael
Santoro who was injured at work and died within months of his inju-
ry." His widow applied for benefits under the LHWCA, and an ALJ
found that the evidence was equally probative on both sides.69 There-
which must be proven in order to establish entitlement to BLBA benefits).
59. 114 S. Ct. at 2253-54.
60. Id. at 2254.
61. Id at 2253-54 (noting that Ondecko qualified for the presumption provided for in
20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b) (1993)).
62. Ondecko spent "[t]he last five to six years . . . [employed by] Greenwich Col-
lieries." Yula, supra note 18, at 361.
63. 30 U.S.C. §§ 932-34 (1988).
64. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1994) and Mullins, 484 U.S. at 135).
68. Id.
69. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254.
1995"] 1061
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fore, he applied the true doubt rule and gave the claimant (Santoro's
widow) the benefit of the doubt concerning such evidence. 0 As a re-
sult of the application of the true doubt rule, Santoro's widow was
awarded benefits.'
The Benefits Review Board affirmed because it found no error in
the ALJ's application of the true doubt rule.72 However, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals again reversed the Board's decision and held
that the true doubt rule conflicts with Section 7(c)." After the Third
Circuit decided the two cases, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the Third Circuit was correct in its decision to invali-
date the true doubt rule on the grounds that it conflicted with Section
7(c).74
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a six to three decision delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Su-
preme Court concluded that Section 7(c) imposes a burden of persua-
sion on BLBA benefits claimants 5 and that the true doubt rule re-
lieves a BLBA benefits claimant of this burden.7'6 Because the true
doubt rule relieves BLBA benefits claimants of the burden of persua-
sion imposed by Section 7(c), the majority held that the true doubt
rule is invalid as applied in BLBA adjudications. 7
As the majority began its analysis, it stated that the case turned on
the meaning of the term burden of proof in Section 7(c)." If burden
of proof meant a burden of persuasion was imposed by Section 7(c),
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id
73. Id.
74. 114 S. Ct. 751 (1994). Again, other issues were presented to the Court but it
avoided such issues because it decided the case under Section 7(c). See supra note 15.
75. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
76. Id. at 2253. As a preliminary matter, the majority concluded that the APA, and,
therefore, Section 7(c) applies to BLBA adjudications. Id. at 2254 (noting that the BLBA
incorporates provisions in the LHWCA that adopt the APA).
77. Id. at 2259.
78. Id. at 2255.
1062 [Vol. 97:1053
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the true doubt rule would be invalid because it relieves BLBA claim-
ants of the burden of persuasion."9 On the other hand, if burden of
proof in Section 7(c) merely meant the burden of production, there
would be no conflict between Section 7(c) and the true doubt rule.8"
Under existing rules of statutory construction, the meaning of Sec-
tion 7(c) could be derived from (1) a definition found within the APA,
(2) the language of the statute, or (3) precedent interpreting the mean-
ing of Section 7(c)." First, the majority searched the APA for a defi-
nition of burden of proof, but unfortunately burden of proof was not
defined by the APA.82 Second, the majority turned to the language
Section 7(c).83 Before beginning this analysis, it explained that statu-
tory language is construed in accordance with its common and ordinary
meaning in the legal community at the time the statute was enacted.
8 4
Therefore, the majority searched for the meaning of the term burden of
proof in 1946, the year the APA was enacted.85
The phrase burden of proof had been ambiguous for many years
because it was used to describe the burden of persuasion, and also
used to describe the burden of production.86 However, the majority
stated that the ambiguity in burden of proof had been eliminated in
Hill v. Smith," a decision rendered about twenty years before the en-
actment of the APA.8 Further, in the "two decades after Hill, ...
[the Court's] opinions consistently distinguished between burden of
79. Id. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (the true doubt rule relieves BLBA
claimants of the burden of persuasion).
80. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct at 2255.
81. Id. at 2255-57. The majority could also have used the legislative history of the
APA to interpret the meaning of Section 7(c). Id. at 2258. However, it found the legislative
history to be vague and "only marginally relevant." Id. at 2258-59.
82. Id. at 2255.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2055 (1993)).
85. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2255.
86. Id. (the burden of production is different from the burden of persuasion because
the former merely imposes the burden of producing evidence while the latter imposes the
risk of non-persuasion).
87. 260 U.S. 592 (1923). In Hill, Justice Holmes stated that "[tihe distinction [between
the burden of proof and the burden of producing evidence] is now very generally accepted,
although often blurred by careless speech." Id. at 594.
88. Greenwich, 114 S. CL at 2255.
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proof, . . defined as burden of persuasion, and an alternative con-
cept, ... increasingly referred to as the burden of production. . ..",
Moreover, the majority referred to the emerging consensus concerning
the meaning of burden of proof among commentators by the time the
APA was enacted.9" Because of Hill and the emerging consensus of
the commentators, the majority concluded that Congress, in enacting
the APA, used burden of proof in Section 7(c) to mean the burden of
persuasion.91
Third, the majority addressed its own precedent which had ana-
lyzed Section 7(c). 92 It admitted that Transportation Management had
stated that Section 7(c) imposes a mere burden of production, which
was contrary to its own conclusion.93 However, the majority dismissed
Transportation Management as too cursory to withstand scrutiny be-
cause the analysis in that case was "ancillary" and "largely
unbriefed."94 Therefore, the footnote in Transportation Management
did not warrant the same level of deference typically given to prece-
dent.95
Furthermore, the majority noted that Steadman interpreted Section
7(c) as requiring administrative decisions to be made in accordance
with the preponderance of the evidence.96 According to the majority,
Steadman "strongly implied" that Section 7(c) imposes a burden of
persuasion.97 The Steadman court had assumed that Section 7(c) im-
89. Id. See, e.g., Webre Steib Co. v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 164, 171 (1945);
Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 111 (1941);
Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1934) (if
a party bears the burden of proof, he "bears a heavy burden of persuasion"); Brosnan v.
Brosnan, 263 U.S. 345, 349 (1923) (finding that burden of proof imposes a burden of per-
suasion, not the mere burden of establishing a prima facie case).
90. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2255.
91. Id. at 2257.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2257.
95. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2255. The court further reasoned that Transportation
Management did not refer to Steadman, its "principal decision interpreting the meaning
of . . . [Section] 7(c)." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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poses a burden of persuasion when it held that such a burden was met
by the preponderance of the evidence standard.98 The majority rea-
soned that "[a] standard of proof, such as preponderance of the evi-
dence, can apply only to a burden of persuasion, not to a burden of
production."99
Based on Steadman and the language of Section 7(c), the majority
stated that "[u]nder . . . [Section] 7(c), . . . when the evidence is
evenly balanced, the benefits claimant must lose."'00 As a result, it
held that the true doubt rule violates Section 7(c) by placing the risk
of non-persuasion on the party opposing a benefits award.' The true
doubt rule, of course, may no longer be used in BLBA adjudica-
tions °2
In its holding, the majority was faithful to Steadman while ex-
panding the Court's holding in that case in two ways. First, the
majority's holding expressly stated that Section 7(c) imposes a burden
of persuasion which is met by the preponderance standard established
in Steadman. °3 Second, it concluded that Section 7(c) requires BLBA
benefits claimants to bear this burden of persuasion.0 4
V. THE DISSENT
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens,
dissented from the majority opinion. ' 5 The dissent attacked the ma-
jority opinion on three grounds. First, it asserted that the majority
misinterpreted the commonly accepted meaning of the term burden of
proof in 1946, the year that the APA was enacted.0 6 Next, it asserted
98. Id.
99. Id. The majority noted that it did not slight the importance of precedent in statu-
tory interpretation, but explained that the Supreme Court precedent concerning Section 7(c)
was "in tension." Id.
100. Id. at 2259.
101. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2259.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 2258-59.
105. Id. at 2259.
106. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct at 2260.
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that the majority should have placed more weight on the legislative
history of the APA.0 7 Finally, it asserted that the majority misinter-
preted the Supreme Court precedent which construes Section 7(c)." 8
First, contrary to the majority's conclusion that the meaning of the
term burden of proof was settled by 1946, the year the APA was en-
acted, the dissent argued that the term burden of proof was still used
to refer to both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production
in 1946.9 For example, a mere nine years after Hill, the case which
had supposedly settled the meaning of the term burden of proof, the
Supreme Court "reverted to using the phrase in its burden of produc-
tion sense" in Heiner v. Donnan."' The dissent was likewise unim-
pressed by the majority's conclusion that the commentators were in
consensus about the meaning of the term burden of proof."' In fact,
the dissent asserted that, in 1946, many commentators believed that the
term burden of proof was still used to refer to both the burden of
persuasion and the burden of production."' Based on Heiner and the
lack of consensus among the commentators, the dissent concluded that
there was no single meaning attached to the term burden of proof at
the time that the APA was enacted." 3
Next, although the majority dismissed the legislative history of the
APA as being unimportant, the dissent concluded that it established
that Congress had indeed given a meaning to Section 7(c)'s burden of
proof provision: the burden of production."' It noted that both the
Senate and the House of Representatives had specified that Section 7(c)
imposes a burden of production."5 Because Congress had expressly
107. Id at 2261.
108. Id. at 2262-63.
109. Id. at 2260.
110. Id. (citing 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932)).
111. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2261.
112. Id. (citing e.g., 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485-86 (J. CHADBOURN REV. ED.
1981)).
113. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2261.
114. Id.
115. Id. The dissent quoted the following material from the Senate and the House of
Representative discussions of Section 7(c):
That the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof means not only that
the party initiating the proceeding has the general burden of coming forward with
1066 [Vol. 97:1053
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stated that Section 7(c) imposes a burden of production and had said
nothing about a burden of persuasion, the dissent concluded that "the
strong probability is that Congress meant to use 'burden of proof to
mean burden of coming forward and not burden of persua-
sion. ,,16
Finally, the dissent believed that the majority position betrayed the
conclusion reached in Transportation Management, which interpreted
Section 7(c) as imposing a mere burden of production."7 According
to the dissent, abandoning Transportation Management was a mistake
which put "the Court at odds with that fundamental principal of prece-
dent that '[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the area
of statutory interpretation, for . . . Congress remains free to alter
what ... [the Court has] done.""' 8
Furthermore, the dissent contended that Steadman did not conflict
with the conclusion reached in Transportation Management." In fact,
it asserted that the two cases analyzed separate issues. 2 ° The dissent
noted that Steadman merely "holds that the party with the burden of
persuasion must satisfy it by a preponderance, but [Steadman] does not
purport to define 'burden of proof ... or to decide who bears the
burden of persuasion . ..",,' Conversely, Transportation Manage-
ment, according to the dissent, clearly concluded that Section 7(c)
a prima facie case but that other parties, who are proponents of some different
result, also for that purpose have a burden to maintain. Similarly the requirement
that no sanction be imposed or rule or order be issued except upon evidence of
the kind specified means that the proponents of a denial of relief must sustain such
denial by that kind of evidence ...
S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1945), reprinted in Legislative History of the
Administrative Procedure Act, S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 208 (1946); H.R.Rep.
No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1946), Leg.Hist. 270-271. See also Greenwich, 114
S. Ct. at 2261 (quoting the material above).
116. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2262.
117. Id. at 2262-63.
118. Id. at 2263 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173
(1989)).
119. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2263.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2264.
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imposes only a burden of production and not a burden of persua-
sion. 2
In summary, the dissent determined that the majority (1) misinter-
preted the commonly accepted meaning of the term burden of proof in
1946, the year that the APA was enacted; (2) should have placed more
weight on the legislative history of the APA; and (3) misinterpreted the
Supreme Court precedent which interprets Section 7(c).' Based on
these determinations, which were contrary to the conclusions reached
by the majority, the dissent concluded that Section 7(c) imposes a mere
burden of production, and, as such, does not conflict with the true
doubt rule. 2 4 Consequently, the dissent refused to join the majority
opinion.1
5
VI. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in Greenwich holds that the true doubt rule
is invalid because it improperly relieves BLBA claimants of the burden
of persuasion imposed by Section 7(c).'26 The majority's opinion is
convincing because Steadman interprets Section 7(c) as imposing a
preponderance of the evidence standard,2 7 which is a burden of per-
suasion. 121
The Greenwich decision has the effect of shifting the burden of
persuasion to BLBA claimants because they now lose when the evi-
dence is evenly balanced,2 9 although it remains to be seen whether
Greenwich will have an impact on the number of BLBA claimants who
receive benefits. Notwithstanding the majority's convincing analysis and
the possible impact of Greenwich, Congress intended for all doubtful
questions of fact to be resolved in favor of BLBA claimants. 3
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
124. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2263-64.
125. Id at 2267.
126. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 49.
129. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
130. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.3 (1994) (interpreting the intent of Congress).
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Therefore, if Congress still intends to give BLBA claimants the benefit
of the doubt, it should enact legislation which revives the true doubt
rule because there is no better example of a doubtful question of fact
than when the evidence is evenly balanced.
A. The Majority's Holding in Greenwich is Convincing
The majority's holding is convincing because a logical extension
of Steadman proves that the true doubt rule conflicts with Section 7(c).
In holding that Section 7(c) imposes a burden of persuasion, the ma-
jority relied on Steadman, which interpreted Section 7(c) as imposing a
preponderance of the evidence standard.' From Steadman's interpre-
tation of Section 7(c), the majority inferred that the preponderance
standard implicitly establishes that Section 7(c) imposes a burden of
persuasion as well.'
This inference is sound because Steadman's holding necessarily
implies that Section 7(c) imposes a burden of persuasion. The prepon-
derance standard is a standard of proof which one party must meet in
order to prevail.'33 In other words, the preponderance standard is a
burden which one party must meet: the burden of persuasion.'34
Therefore, because Steadman holds that Section 7(c) imposes a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, it also holds, by implication, that
Section 7(c) imposes a burden of persuasion.135 Thus, when the ma-
jority interpreted Section 7(c) as imposing a burden of persuasion, it
simply expressed the inference which necessarily follows from
Steadman.
Admittedly, Steadman does not expressly state who must bear this
burden of persuasion imposed by Section 7(c). 3 ' However, it is nor-
mal for the party who initiates the litigation and asks the court to
131. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text
133. Dix ET AL., supra note 27, at § 339.
134. Id.
135. See id. See also Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2258 (the majority opinion reached the
same conclusion).
136. See Steadman, 450 U.S. at 100-02.
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invoke its power to bear the burden of persuasion.' 7 In BLBA litiga-
tion, the BLBA claimant is the party who initiates the litigation and
asks the court to invoke its power to award BLBA benefits.' There-
fore, the majority logically concluded that Section 7(c) imposes its
burden of persuasion on BLBA claimants. From this analysis, the
majority's adherence to the normal rule dictating which party bears the
burden of persuasion and reliance on Steadman's interpretation of Sec-
tion 7(c) justifies its decision to invalidate the true doubt rule.
On the other hand, Transportation Management reached a conclu-
sion that is contrary to the majority's interpretation of Section 7(c). "'39
Indeed, Transportation Management expressly stated that Section 7(c)
imposes only a "burden of going forward, not the burden of persua-
sion."' 40 Therefore, the only question is whether Transportation Man-
agement carries weight as precedent.
The majority convincingly asserts that Transportation Management
should not carry weight as precedent because the conclusion about
Section 7(c) in that case was too brief and too cursory to be of
precedential value.' At the very least, Transportation Management
does not deserve the same precedential value as Steadman. The
Steadman analysis of Section 7(c) was thoughtful and in-depth,'42
while Transportation Management merely glossed over an argument
137. Dix Er AL., supra note 27, at § 337. "The burdens of pleading and proof ...
have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present
state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of
proof or persuasion." Id.
138. See, e.g., Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1093 (BLBA claimant initiated the litigation and
asked the court to award benefits); Old Ben Coal Co. v. Battram, 7 F.3d 1273, 1275 (7th
Cir. 1993).
139. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (according to Transportation Manage-
ment, Section 7(c) imposes a mere burden of production). See also supra note 93 and ac-
companying text (the majority recognized that its interpretation of Section 7(c) conflicts with
the conclusion reached in Transportation Management). But see supra notes 119-20 and
accompanying text (the dissenting opinion argued that Transportation Management and
Steadman do not conflict).
140. See 462 U.S. at 393 n.7.
141. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
142. 450 U.S. at 98-104 (analyzing the language of Section 7(c), applicable case law
and legislative history).
1070 [Vol. 97:1053
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss4/9
DIRECTOR, OWCP V GREENWICH
concerning Section 7(c) in a footnote. 43 Moreover, Transportation
Management paid little attention to the meaning of Section 7(c), and
did not even mention Steadman.' Although the dissent argued that
the outcome of Transportation Management may have been different if
the footnote had turned the other way,'45 it seems more logical to in-
fer that the Transportation Management court either ignored Steadman
or failed to make the connection that Steadman necessarily implies that
Section 7(c) imposes a burden of persuasion. 46 From this analysis,
the majority properly disregarded Transportation Management and
properly relied on Steadman.
Although the majority properly relied on Steadman, its conclusion
that the common and ordinary meaning of burden of proof referred to
the burden of persuasion is problematic. Heiner, which was cited by
the dissent, is a clear example of how the term burden of proof was
used to refer to the burden of production as well as the burden of
persuasion at the time the APA was enacted. 7 Furthermore, the
majority's assertion that the commentators were in consensus about the
meaning of the term burden of proof is in dispute. Commentators have
noted that burden of proof has traditionally been used to refer to both
the burden of persuasion and the burden of production.'48 From this
analysis, the majority was perhaps misguided in its belief that com-
mentators were unanimous and, therefore, mistakenly asserted that the
definition of burden of proof was settled as meaning the burden of
persuasion by the time the APA was enacted.
143. 462 U.S. at 403 n.7.
144. Id.
145. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2263 (explaining that if the Transportation Management
court had concluded that Section 7(c) imposed a burden of persuasion, then Section 7(c)
would have been an "impedimenf' to the National Labor Relations Board's rule which im-
poses the burden of persuasion on the party opposing the claim).
146. But cf Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2263-64. The dissent asserted that in Steadman
"it was uncontested . . . that the burden of persuasion was on the Government [while] . . .
Transportation Management . . . holds that 'burden of proof in . . . [Section] 7(c) means
burden of production. Id. at 2264. "The question left open by each decision is who bears
the burden of persuasion." Id.
147. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Dix ET AL., supra note 27, at § 336.
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However, the majority's misguided belief does not mean that the
definition of burden of proof was the burden of production at the time
the APA was enacted. Instead, the mistaken assertion means only that
the burden of proof provision in Section 7(c) could have meant either
a burden of production or a burden of persuasion at the time the APA
was enacted.'49 Moreover, because the majority properly relied on
Steadman about the meaning of Section 7(c), 50 the possible mistake
concerning the meaning of burden of proof at the time the APA was
enacted is irrelevant.
As the dissent points out, however, the majority also dismissed the
legislative history of the APA."' The applicable legislative history
explains that Section 7(c) imposes a burden of production and says
nothing about Section 7(c) imposing a burden of persuasion.' Thus,
because the applicable legislative history indicates that Section 7(c) im-
poses a mere burden of production but is silent about whether it im-
poses a persuasion, the majority's dismissal of the legislative history
appears questionable.
Nevertheless, the Steadman holding justifies the majority's decision
to dismiss the legislative history of the APA. If Section 7(c) did not
impose a burden of persuasion, it would not require decisions to be
made in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence, which is a
burden of persuasion.'53 Further, because Steadman interprets Section
7(c) as imposing the preponderance standard, Section 7(c) imposes a
burden of persuasion, even if the legislative history indicates that Sec-
tion 7(c) imposes a burden of production as well.'54
149. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 115 (the material therein contains the applicable legislative history).
153. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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B. The Impact of Greenwich
The most obvious impact of Greenwich is that the true doubt rule
is no longer permitted to be used in BLBA adjudications. 55 There-
fore, when the evidence is evenly balanced on both sides, the BLBA
claimant loses.'56 Thus, Greenwich has the effect of shifting the bur-
den of persuasion from the employer who opposes a benefits award to
the BLBA claimant. 5
Whether shifting the burden of persuasion to BLBA claimants will
result in a lower percentage of successful benefits claims remains to be
seen. On one hand, it is difficult for a coal miner to prove that he is
entitled to BLBA benefits.158 Therefore, forcing the BLBA claimant
to bear the risk of non-persuasion about whether his disability has
totally disabled him and the other prerequisites to entitlement may
result in a lower percentage of benefits awards.'59
On the other hand, the true doubt rule can be invoked only when
the evidence is equally probative,' which is a rare situation."'
Indeed, "[v]ery seldom will the evidence ... be equally proba-
tive .. ,,'62 Thus, it may be that Greenwich's invalidation of the
true doubt rule will not have an impact on the number of BLBA
claimants who receive benefits.163
155. See supra note 102 and accompanying text
156. See supra note 100 and accompanying text
157. See id.
158. See supra note 8.
159. See Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1101 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall noted that the true
doubt rule would occasionally allow a BLBA claimant to win even though he was not in
fact entitled to benefits. Id. Judge Hall's statement was an admission that the true doubt rule
serves to slightly increase the number of claimants who receive benefits. See id. Therefore,
it can be inferred that, in the absence of the true doubt rule, the number of successful
BLBA claimants, will decrease slightly.
160. See supra note 26.
161. See Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1097.
162. Id. Grizzle also states that "it would seem to be the unusual case in which, an
ALJ intent on properly weighing the competing evidence, will come to the conclusion that
neither side's evidence was even slightly more convincing than the other's." Id.
163. See id. at 1101 (Hall, J., dissenting)(the true doubt rule only has an "occasional"
impact on BLBA litigation).
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Beyond the question of whether the Greenwich decision will have
an impact on the number of coal miners who receive BLBA benefits,
the decision may be a message about the Court's attitude concerning
interpretation of the BLBA. The true doubt rule was a judicial con-
struct implicitly authorized by the BLBA.'" Greenwich, however, in-
validated the true doubt rule.'65 Therefore, the Court may have meant
to send a message that it will invalidate judicial theories that go be-
yond the express language of the BLBA, even though the general poli-
cy of the BLBA is to resolve doubts in favor of claimants. t' If this
is the message, it evidences a conservative outlook toward interpreta-
tion of the BLBA.
Greenwich may also be a message to Congress. The Court is un-
likely to reverse Greenwich because it rarely reverses its own prece-
dent, and especially precedent that interprets a statute. 7 Consequent-
ly, if Congress wishes for BLBA claimants to win when the evidence
is evenly balanced, the responsibility now rests with Congress to enact
legislation which exempts the BLBA from Section 7(c) and revives the
true doubt rule. 6
C. Congress Should Revive the True Doubt Rule
Congress should enact legislation which revives the true doubt rule
because of the policy underlying the BLBA' 69 Greenwich is a strict
interpretation of the BLBA because it refuses to uphold a judicial prac-
tice that is not expressly authorized in the language of the BLBA."'7
However, Congress did not intend for the BLBA to be strictly con-
164. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text; Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1096 n.3 (the
justification for the true doubt rule is implicit in the principles underlying the BLBA).
165. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
166. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254-55 (the true doubt rule is not authorized by
the express language of the BLBA).
167. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
168. See id. at 172-73 (explaining that Congress may enact legislation which overrules
a Supreme Court holding).
169. Congress would not have to overrule Greenwich in order to revive the true doubt
rule, and instead could merely except the BLBA from Section 7(c). See supra note 30 (Sec-
tion 7(c) applies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute . . .
170. See supra note 166.
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strued and, instead, intended for courts to construe the BLBA liberally
in favor of BLBA claimants.
171
Indeed, in enacting the BLBA, Congress recognized that it is diffi-
cult for BLBA claimants to prove that they are entitled to benefits. 72
Moreover, Congress was sympathetic towards coal miners for the pain
and suffering they endured upon contracting black lung.173 Based on
the difficulty of proving entitlement to BLBA benefits and congres-
sional sympathy towards the plight of coal miners, Congress intended
for doubtful questions of fact to be resolved in favor of BLBA claim-
ants. 74 Thus, if Congress truly intends to give BLBA claimants the
benefit of the doubt, it should revive the true doubt rule because the
true doubt rule applies when the evidence is equally balanced, which is
a perfect example of a doubtful question of fact.
75
Furthermore, Congress had a valid reason for adopting the policy
of resolving doubts in favor of BLBA claimants. Coal miners who
contract black lung endure the horrible effects of a painful and crip-
pling disease. 76 On top of the horrible effects of black lung disease,
these coal miners must meet the difficult task of proving that they are
entitled to BLBA benefits. 77 Thus, the horrible effects inflicted by
black lung disease, when coupled with the difficulty of proving enti-
171. See Freeman, 988 F.2d at 709-10 (noting that "[t]he true doubt rule is a judicial
construct designed to effectuate Congress's intent that the . . . [BLBA] be liberally con-
strued to ensure payment to deserving claimants")(emphasis added).
Of course, it may be argued that the Greenwich majority should not have ignored
the general policy of the BLBA which requires doubt to be resolved in favor of BLBA
claimants. However, as was aptly stated by the majority, the "ambiguous [BLBA] regulation
[interpreting congressional intent] does not overcome the presumption that . . . adjudications
under the BLBA are subject to . . . [Section] 7(c)'s burden of proof provision." 114 S. Ct.
at 2255.
172. See Mullins, 484 U.S. at 158 ("[a]s a matter of policy, Congress was aware that it
is difficult for coal miners . . . to prove" that they are entitled to BLBA benefits). But see
id. (arguing that if a coal miner has not shown that he is suffering from black lung, he has
not shown that he belongs to the group Congress was concerned about: coal miners with
black lung disease).
173. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
174. See Freeman, 988 F.2d at 710.
175. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 8.
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tlement to BLBA benefits, creates a need to resolve doubts in favor of
the BLBA claimant.
In all fairness, there are some reasons against Congress adopting
the true doubt rule. The true doubt rule makes it easier for BLBA
claimants to receive benefits because it places the risk of non persua-
sion on the party opposing a BLBA benefits award. 7 ' Therefore, a
revival of the true doubt rule could lead to a larger amount of money
being paid out in BLBA benefits, 79 which would have an impact on
the two sources of funding from which the money for BLBA benefits
is taken.
The first source of funding is the coal companies.' BLBA
claims filed after December 31, 1973 are, if approved, paid by the
claimant's former employer.'8' If coal mining companies must pay
out more money in benefits, their profitability could be effected.'
Lower profits could, of course, have an impact on the overall econom-
ic well-being of the coal industry.' The second source of funding
for BLBA benefits is the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (hereinafter
BLDTF).'84 Benefits are paid from this fund when the benefit money
cannot be obtained from the coal company that is liable.'85 Notably,
this fund is already operating at a deficit. 8 ' Therefore, any further
strain on the BLDTF, however small, would likely increase the deficit
that already exists.
However, there is no proof that reviving the true doubt rule would
have any noticeable impact on the amount of BLBA benefits paid out
178. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
179. See Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1100-01 (a BLBA claimant "wins all ties").
180. 30 U.S.C. §§ 932-34 (1988).
181. Id. See Allen R. Prunty and Mark E. Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Pro-
gram: Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665, 669 n.9 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter "Prunty"J.
182. See Prunty, supra note 181, at 669 (explaining that the coal industry, which has
"more than its share of. . . problems," objects to being singled out to bear the cost of the
BLBA).
183. See id. at 668 (discussing the declining fortunes of the coal industry).
184. 30 U.S.C. § 934 (1988).
185. Id. See Pninty, supra note 181, at 683.
186. Prunty, supra note 181, at 669 n.9.
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by the coal mining companies and the BLDTF. Indeed, as previously
discussed, the true doubt rule only applies in the rare situation where
the evidence concerning entitlement to BLBA benefits is equally bal-
anced on both sides.'87 From this analysis, it appears that the cost
implications of reviving the true doubt rule are probably negligible
and, therefore, not a valid argument against reviving it.
In addition, if the revived true doubt rule did begin to have a
noticeable impact on the amount of money which coal mining compa-
nies were forced to pay out, it would not be a signal that the true
doubt rule should be discarded, but instead it would be a signal that
ALJs were applying the true doubt rule incorrectly.188 As mentioned,
the true doubt rule only applies if the evidence is actually in equi-
poise. 89 It does not apply when there is merely some evidence sup-
porting the BLBA claim and overwhelming evidence against the
claim. 9 Thus, the true doubt rule, when properly applied, is not a
frequently used doctrine. 9 ' In the end, the true doubt rule is a policy
question which asks whether the BLBA claimant should bear the risk
of non-persuasion or whether the party opposing the benefits should
bear it. Given the policy behind the BLBA and the rarity of situations
in which the true doubt rule applies, Congress should revive the true
doubt rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
The majority's holding in Greenwich is more convincing than the
dissent's analysis because a logical extension of Steadman proves that
the true doubt rule conflicts with Section 7(c). Steadman interprets
Section 7(c) as imposing a preponderance of the evidence standard.
The preponderance standard is a burden which one party must meet:
the burden of persuasion. Therefore, because Steadman holds that Sec-
tion 7(c) imposes a preponderance of the evidence standard, it also
187. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (the true doubt rule applies only in
the rare situations where the evidence is equally balanced).
189. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
190. See Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1097-98.
191. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
1995] 1077
25
Brown: Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries: The End of the True Doubt
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
holds, by implication, that the statute imposes a burden of persuasion.
Thus, when the majority interpreted Section 7(c) as imposing a burden
of persuasion, it simply expressed the inference which necessarily fol-
lows from Steadman.
The majority properly disregarded Transportation Management
because the analysis was too cursory and brief to carry weight as pre-
cedent. Further, the majority was correct in placing the burden of per-
suasion imposed by Section 7(c) on BLBA claimants because the bur-
den of persuasion is generally placed on the party who initiates the
litigation and seeks to invoke the court's power. Under Greenwich, the
true doubt rule may no longer be used in BLBA adjudications and,
therefore, when the evidence is evenly balanced on both sides, the
BLBA claimant now loses. Thus, Greenwich has the effect of shifting
the burden of persuasion from the employer who opposes a benefits
award to the BLBA claimant. However, whether shifting the burden of
persuasion to BLBA claimants will result in a lower percentage of
successful benefits claims remains to be seen.
Greenwich may be interpreted as a message to Congress. The
Court is unlikely to reverse its own precedent, especially precedent
which interprets a statute, so it is unlikely that the Court will overrule
Greenwich. Thus, the fate of the true doubt rule now rests with Con-
gress, which has the power to codify the true doubt rule and overrule
Greenwich.
Congress should enact legislation that revives the true doubt rule
because of the policy underlying the BLBA. In enacting the BLBA,
Congress recognized that it is difficult for coal miners to prove that
they are entitled to BLBA benefits. Furthermore, Congress recognized
the effect black lung has on its victims.
Therefore, Congress, in enacting the BLBA, intended for all doubt-
ful questions of fact to be decided in favor of BLBA claimants. If
Congress truly did intend for BLBA claimants the benefit of all
doubts, it should legislate the validity of the true doubt rule because
there is no better example of a doubtful question of fact than when the
evidence is equally balanced.
Allan W. Brown
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